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THE PAST IS ANOTHER COUNTRY:
AGAINST THE RETROACTIVE
APPLICABILITY OF THE FOREIGN
IMMUNITIES ACT TO PRE-1952 CONDUCT
ANDRZEJ R. NIEKRASZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In late 2000, fifteen Asian women who had been victims of
rape, torture and sexual slavery at the hands of Japanese soldiers
during World War II, filed a class-action lawsuit against Japan in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.1 In
their complaint, the plaintiffs, commonly referred to by the media
as "comfort women,"2 stated that they, and approximately 200,000
other women, were victims of sexual slavery and mass rape
instituted by the government of Japan for the purpose of servicing
the Japanese army.3 Treated as mere military supplies, the
comfort women "were even catalogued on supply lists under the
heading of 'ammunition."'4 They were now seeking compensation
for the inhumane treatment they experienced, and an apology
from the Japanese government. 5
J.D. Candidate, June 2005. The author would like to
thank Carmen.
1. See Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 172 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2001)
[hereinafter Hwang I] (granting Japan's motion to dismiss). See generally
Dana R. Gotfredsen, Seeking Comfort in America: Why an Amendment to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act Is the Most Effective Means of Holding
Foreign Governments Accountable for Gender-Based Crimes, 15 EMORY INVL
L. REv. 647 (2001) (providing more details on the comfort women case and
arguing in favor of further eroding foreign sovereign immunities in the narrow
context of gender-based crimes).
2. The term derives from "comfort stations," facilities seized or built by the
Imperial Japanese Army near the front lines to house sex slaves, recruited
through "forcible abductions, deception and coercion." Hwang I, 172 F. Supp.
2d at 54-55.
3. Id. at 55-56.
4. Id. at 55.
5. Id. at 56. The complaint asserted that "[iun the decades after the
war,..,. Japan largely ignored and denied allegations concerning the 'comfort
women' system."
Id.
Although the Japanese government officially
acknowledged the existence of comfort stations in 1992, it had not, by the time
of filing the suit, "taken full responsibility for its actions, and has not paid
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On October 4, 2001, the district court dismissed the case.6
The dismissal was affirmed by a panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in June 2003.'
In its opinion, the circuit court wrote that "as [mluch as we
may feel for the plight of the appellants, the courts of the United
The court
States simply are not authorized to hear their case.
held that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")
effectively barred an American court's jurisdiction over the action.9
Yet, contrary to the court's assertion, the matter is far from
simple.10
The several enumerated exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity," which do allow the courts to hear actions against
foreign governments, have been subject to creative definitional
interpretation and considerable judicial inconsistency if not
confusion." What might be termed the judicial impulse toward
plaintiff-oriented equity has played a larger role in other circuit
courts' adjudication of similar claims. 3
reparations to the 'comfort women.'" Id.
6. Id. at 67.
7. See Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 332 F.3d 679, 687 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
[hereinafter Hwang II] (holding that the commercial activity exception to the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was not retroactively applicable and that
Japan's alleged violations ofjus cogens norm did not constitute implied waiver
of immunity under FSIA), vacated and remanded by 124 S. Ct. 2835 (2004).
8. Id. at 687.
9. The court emphasized the narrowness of its holding in its conclusion.
Id.
10. A conviction that the issue has become, perhaps unavoidably, far from
simple permeates this entire Comment, and is discussed at length in sections
below.
11. See infra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
12. To cite but one example, the Ninth Circuit recently held that
application of the FSIA to facts arising from World War II was not
impermissibly retroactive, a conclusion directly opposite to the one reached in
Hwang I. See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 317 F.3d 954, 967 (9th Cir.
2002) [hereinafter Altmann II] (affirming the district court's denial of the
defendant's motion to dismiss), affd, 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004). Although all
appellate courts base their analysis on the same Supreme Court precedents,
they gloss over any inconsistencies in their holdings. See infra notes 34-48
and accompanying text for a discussion of these precedents. See also Hwang
11, 332 F.3d at 684 (stating in passing that "[tihe decisions of the Ninth Circuit
are, of course, not binding on this court").
13. See Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 964-67 (noting the views that other courts
have used regarding similar matters). But cf. Garb v. Republic of Poland, 72
Fed. Appx. 850, 853 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2003) [ hereinafter Garb III (vacating the
district court's dismissal in an unpublished summary order). The district
court's decision itself was based on the notion that the Act could not be applied
retroactively to a claim arising from pre-1952 conduct. Id. at 853-54. See
generally Garb v. Republic of Poland, 207 F. Supp. 2d 16 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)
[hereinafter Garb I] (granting a motion to dismiss and holding that FSIA is
not retroactively applicable to the extent it overrules prior law, and that
defendant's conduct was not in connection to commercial activity within the
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The issue of the retroactive applicability of the FSIA is clearly
controversial in this age of importing global human rights
litigation to the American civil justice system.1 4 The controversy
has in fact recently caught the attention of the United States
Supreme Court, which has agreed to address it in its October 2003
term.1 5
meaning of the exception to sovereign immunity).
14. The recent increase, if not explosion, in such litigation is largely
attributable to the application of the long-forgotten 1789 Alien Torts Claims
Act ("ATCA"), which declares that federal district courts "shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1350 (2000). See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877-79 (2d Cir.
1980) (applying ATCA to find jurisdiction in an action by Paraguayan
nationals seeking asylum in the United States against a Paraguayan national
who was in the United States on a visitor's visa for alleged acts of torture and
murder). The ATCA is naturally distinct from the FSIA, and only the latter
provides jurisdiction against foreign sovereign governments. There exists, of
course, a vast body of legal scholarship on the general subject matter of
enforcing international law in American domestic courts. See generally, e.g.,
Judge Edward D. Re, The Universal Declarationof Human Rights: Effective
Remedies and the Domestic Courts, 33 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 137 (2003)
(commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and assessing progress made in achieving fundamental
principles of human rights and freedoms, and focusing on the role of domestic
courts in enforcements of these fundamental human rights as legal rights).
There are, however, recent signs of a judicial backlash against an expansive
application of the ATCA, especially when the complainants attempt to stretch
the concept of legal rights beyond the cognizable limits. See, e.g., Flores v. S.
Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 160 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming the dismissal of
the plaintiffs' action, which alleged that pollution from the mining company's
Peruvian operations caused severe lung disease, for lack of jurisdiction and
failure to state claim, and holding "rights to health and life" are insufficiently
definite to be binding rules of customary international law required under
ATCA).
15. With the present issue already in production, the Supreme Court
decision in Republic of Austria v. Altmann, due by late June, was indeed
handed down on June 7, 2004. See Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004). In the
majority opinion signed by Justice Stevens, the Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit, and held that the FSIA applied to preenactment conduct and even to
conduct that occurred prior to the United States' adoption of the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity in 1952. Id. To reach its conclusion, the
majority (with Justices Scalia and Breyer and Souter concurring in separate
opinions) had to find that Landgrafs strong admonition against retroactivity
simply did not apply to the FSIA. Id. at 2249. In a strong dissent, joined by
the Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, Justice Kennedy noted that the Court's
decision will "weaken the reasoning and diminish the force of the rule against
the retroactivity of statutes, a rule of fairness based on respect for
expectations." Id. at 2263. He observed that the Court's suggestion that "the
Executive Branch has inherent power to intervene in cases like this ...
reintroduces, to an even greater degree than before, the same influences the
FSIA sought to eliminate from sovereign immunity determinations." Id.
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). He concluded with the statement that "the ultimate
effect of the Court's inviting foreign nations to pressure the Executive is to
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In anticipation of the Supreme Court decision, this Comment
aims to analyze the recent FSIA appellate jurisprudence, and,
relying on the Supreme Court's own recent retroactivity case law,
argue against extending the FSIA's reach to World War II-related
actions. 6 Part II will present a brief historical overview of foreign
sovereign immunity in federal courts, focusing on the transition
from an absolute to a restrictive theory of immunity. It will
introduce the two dates critical in discussing the retroactive
applicability of the FSIA: 1952 and 1976. Additionally, it will
present the Act's chief purposes and provisions.
Part III will discuss several recent appellate decisions
concerning World War II-related claims, and the courts' analysis
of, and increasing willingness to permit, the retroactive
applicability of the Act. Against the backdrop of the recent
Supreme Court retroactive legislation jurisprudence, the
discussion will then trace the judicial reasoning in expanding the
retroactive application of the FSIA. Part III will also critique the
judicial tendency to widen the scope of the immunity exceptions on
two grounds: first, as undermining the legislative intent behind
the FSIA, and second, as potentially encroaching on the executive
and legislative branches of the government.
Finally, Part IV will propose reversing the trend to legitimize
the retroactive applicability of the FSIA. Recognizing the genuine

risk inconsistent results for private citizens who sue, based on changes and
nuances in foreign affairs, and to add prospective instability to the most
sensitive area of foreign relations." Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice
Kennedy's view that the majority opinion represents "the illogic of [the
Court's] own creation" assures this Comment's continued relevance beyond the
Court's present holding, as the analysis contained in the following pages
remains fundamentally unchanged. See id. at 2275 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
The question of the FSIA's retroactive applicability is bound to remain as
important as it is complicated, made additionally so by the Court's ruling.
16. The argument against applying the FSIA retroactively has been made
before. See generally Adam K.A. Mortara, The Case Against Retroactive
Application of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 253 (2001) (arguing that courts should not apply FSIA retroactively to
commercial transactions occurring before 1952). Although this Comment is in
line with Mortara's fundamental argument, our respective emphases differ
considerably. Mortara focuses primarily on strictly commercial transactions
(such as bond issuance) occurring before 1952, whereas this Comment
discusses specifically World War II-related tort claims, most of them
postdating the Mortara article, and which can be hardly categorized as
commercial in nature. See Garb I, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 30-31 (reasoning that
the FSIA commercial activity exception is "intended to cover a foreign state's
activities as a private player in the marketplace, not to expose a foreign state
to liability for its sovereign activities"). Equally important is the discussion of
the post-Landgraf Supreme Court retroactivity jurisprudence, largely absent
in Mortara's analysis. That said, this Comment certainly can, and perhaps
should, be construed as bringing the extant FSIA retroactivity discourse to
date.
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and legitimate grievances brought by plaintiffs in these actions,
this Comment will conclude by suggesting that these grievances be
addressed by means other than civil litigation.
II.

FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN CONTEXT

A. ForeignSovereign Immunity in FederalCourts:A Historical
Overview
The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity has been an
integral part of American law since at least the early nineteenth
century. 17 In 1812, Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that while
the jurisdiction of a nation within its own territory "is susceptible
of no limitation not imposed by itself," the United States had
impliedly waived jurisdiction over activities of foreign sovereigns.18
Originally, the immunity from suit in the American courts granted
to foreign sovereigns was virtually absolute. 9 The courts usually
made their jurisdictional decisions by deferring to the will of the
executive branch, which in turn ordinarily requested immunity in
all actions against friendly foreign sovereigns. 0
As sovereigns began increasingly engaging in commercial

17. See generally The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
116 (1812) (holding no jurisdiction existed over an armed vessel in the service
of Napoleon, but physically present within the United States territory). In
that seminal case, Chief Justice John Marshall dismissed American citizens'
claim of ownership over a French vessel on the grounds of sovereign
immunity, explaining that the "perfect equality and absolute independence" of
sovereign nations required U.S. courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction
over claims against foreign states. Id. at 137.
18. Id. at 136. Given the "absolute independence" of sovereign nations, a
sovereign could be supposed to enter a foreign territory only "in the confidence
that [its sovereign immunities] are reserved by implication, and will be
extended to him." Id. at 137. Espousing this so-called "implied license" theory
allowed Chief Justice Marshall to conclude that there was no jurisdiction over
the vessel. Id. at 147. Although the narrow holding in the case was only that
United States courts lacked jurisdiction over an armed ship of a foreign state
found in an American port, the opinion came to stand for the absolute doctrine
of foreign sovereign immunity. See Garb I, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 21 (observing
that the doctrine "originated in an era of personal sovereignty, when the
assertion of jurisdiction by one sovereign over another" constituted "an affront
to the latter's dignity and independence").
19. The doctrine arose and took shape, significantly, not on constitutional
or statutory grounds but rather as a matter of inter-governmental grace and
comity. See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 575 (1926) (refusing
to exercise jurisdiction over foreign sovereign property "within its territory,
and, therefore, but for the common agreement, subject to its jurisdiction").
20. In 1943, the Supreme Court expressly endorsed deference to
"suggestions of immunity" from the executive branch. See Ex parte Republic
of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 586 (1943) (noting that claims against "a friendly
sovereign state [are] normally presented and settled in the course of the
conduct of foreign affairs by the President and by the Department of State").
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activities, the international law concept of sovereign immunity
evolved. Over time, an international consensus emerged that
when a sovereign state enters the marketplace and acts as a
private party, there is no justification for allowing it to avoid the
economic cost of breached agreements and accidents. This theory,
known as the "restrictive" theory of immunity, draws a distinction
between causes arising out of a foreign state's governmental
activities (public acts or jure imperii) and its commercial or
proprietary acts (private acts or jure gestionis).2" In 1952, the
restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity officially replaced
the old absolute doctrine in the United States.2
After 1952, the State Department continued to decide most
foreign sovereign immunity claims. Absent a foreign government's
request for the executive intervention, however, the courts took it
upon themselves to resolve the immunity question.2
Not
surprisingly, the resulting rules were neither clear nor uniform.24
21. For more details on the international law developments leading to the
1952 adoption of the restrictive theory, see William R. Dorsey, III, Reflections
on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 257, 258-59 (1997) (discussing the background and purpose of FSIA as
well as its amendments and judicial interpretations).
22. The change was effectuated by the State Department's issuance of the
Tate Letter. See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, Department
of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General of the United States
(May 19, 1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter] (quoted in full in Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 711-15 (1976)). The letter
expressed the State Department's conclusion that "immunity should no longer
be granted in certain types of cases." Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 711.
The
Department found it "evident that with the possible exception of the United
Kingdom little support has been found except on the part of the Soviet Union
and its satellites for continued full acceptance of the absolute theory of
sovereign immunity." Id. at 714. The letter therefore declared that the State
Department's recommendation to the courts would be henceforth governed by
the restrictive theory. Id. Over time, courts came to use the Tate Letter
standard as a default rule to be applied in cases where the State Department
remained silent. See Heany v. Gov't of Spain, 445 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1971)
(dismissing a contract claim against Spain based on Tate Letter standards,
and noting that courts have "deferred to the policy pronouncements of the
State Department" to avoid the 'possible embarrassment to those responsible
for the conduct of the nation's foreign relations").
23. As sovereign immunity determinations were made in two separate
branches of the government, they were subject to a variety of frequently
conflicting factors, including diplomatic considerations and pressures. See
Verlinden B. V. v. Cent. Bank of Nig., 461 U.S. 480, 486-88 (1983) (discussing
the history behind the FSIA).
24. See Danny Abir, Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act: The Right to a Jury
Trial in Suits Against Foreign Government-Owned Corporations,32 STAN. J.
INT'L L. 159, 165 (1996) (discussing practical difficulties in applying restrictive
theory before 1976); Michael A. Tessitore, Immunity and the Foreign
Sovereign: An Introduction to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 73 FLA.
B.J. 48, 48-49 (Nov. 1999) (noting that the courts found application of the
restrictive theory difficult, finding establishing standards for differentiating
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To redress the situation, Congress enacted the FSIA in 1976. 5
Intended to "free the Government from the case-by-case diplomatic
pressures" and to clarify the governing standards, the Act
purported to guarantee litigants that "decisions are made on
purely legal grounds and under procedures that insure due
process."" The law was designed to codify the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity and to insulate the subject from diplomatic
pressures by "transferring such decisions to the judiciary."27 To
accomplish these goals, the FSIA "contains a comprehensive set of
legal standards governing claims of immunity in every civil action
against a foreign state or its political subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities."
Since its enactment, the FSIA has provided the sole basis for
obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state and its agencies and
instrumentalities in a United States court.n The FSIA retains the
initial presumption of foreign sovereign immunity in American
courts. Under the FSIA, a foreign state is presumptively immune
from federal courts' jurisdiction unless that state's conduct gives
rise to a claim that falls within a set of exceptions codified in 28
U.S.C. §§ 1605 and 1607.30 In other words, if the claim does not
fall within one of the exceptions, federal courts lack both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign
defendant, and the claim must be dismissed.3
between public and private especially tricky).
25. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1989).
26. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604).
27. Abrams v. Societe Nationale Des Chemins De Fer Francais, 332 F.3d
173, 178 (2d Cir. 2003) [hereinafter Abrams II]. In Abrams II, the Second
Circuit held that the record was insufficient to assess whether application of
FSIA would have an impermissible retroactive effect of effectively
extinguishing the plaintiffs' causes of action. Id. at 188.
28. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
29. See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428,
434 (1989) (dismissing an action by Liberian corporations against the
Argentine Republic under the alien tort statute for lack of jurisdiction, and
holding that only FSIA can provide jurisdiction over a foreign state).
30. These exceptions include actions in which the foreign state has
explicitly or impliedly waived its immunity, actions based on commercial
activities of the foreign sovereign carried on in the United States or causing a
direct effect in the United States, actions in which rights in property taken in
violation of international law are in issue, actions involving rights in real
estate and in inherited and gift property located in the United States, actions
for certain noncommercial torts within the United States, and certain actions
involving maritime liens and certain counterclaims. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1)(5), 1605(b), 1607 (2000).
31. Under § 1330(a), federal district courts are provided subject matter
jurisdiction if a foreign state is not entitled to immunity. Personal jurisdiction
extends under § 1330(b) wherever subject matter jurisdiction exists under
subsection (a) and service of process has been made under § 1608. Verlinden,
461 U.S. at 485 n.5.
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The Act contains no express provision regarding its
retroactivity.
There is, however,
language indicating
prospectivity. The Act directs that "[cilaims of foreign states to
immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United
States .. 3. in conformity with the principles set forth in this
chapter."
B. Recent Supreme CourtRetroactivity Jurisprudence:Landgraf
and Its Progeny
In 1994, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of statutory
retroactivity head on.'
In Landgraf v. USI Film Products, the
Court reiterated
the time-honored
presumption
against
retroactivity.34 Invoking "[e]lementary considerations of fairness,"
the Court reaffirmed the view that parties "should have an
opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct
accordingly;"
settled expectations should not be lightly
36
disrupted."
Recognizing that retroactivity provisions may serve "entirely
benign and legitimate purposes, "K however, the Court repeated
the requirement that "Congress first make its intention clear" as
to an act's retroactivity.'
In the absence of clear intention, under the Court's analysis, a

32. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (emphasis added).
33. See Landgrafv. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 285-86 (1994) (affirming
judgment for the defendants in a Title VII action alleging sexual harassment
and retaliation, and holding that provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
creating right to recover compensatory and punitive damages for certain
violations of Title VII, and providing for trial by jury if such damages are
claimed, do not apply to a Title VII case pending on appeal when the statute
was enacted).
34. Id. at 264. The Court recalled "the axiom that 'retroactivity is not
favored in the law,' and its interpretive corollary that 'congressional
enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive
effect unless their language requires this result.'" Id. See also DANIEL E.
TROY, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION (1998) (presenting moral and economic
arguments against retroactive legislation, arguing that the principle that the
rules not be changed in the middle of the game is essential to the rule of law,
and calling for political and procedural mechanisms to protect settled,
investment-backed expectations in a purely domestic context).
35. Landgraf,511 U.S. at 265.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 267-68. Such "benign" and "legitimate" purposes may consist of
"whether to respond to emergencies, to correct mistakes, to prevent
circumvention of a new statute in the interval immediately preceding its
passage, or simply to give comprehensive effect to a new law Congress
considers salutary." Id. at 268.
38. Id. The Court reasoned that "a requirement that Congress first make
its intention clear helps ensure that Congress itself has determined that the
benefits of retroactivity outweigh the potential for disruption or unfairness."
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district court "must determine whether the new statute would
have retroactive effect."9
That, in turn, involves considering
"whether it would impair rights a party possessed when he acted,
increase a party's liability for past conduct, or impose new duties
with respect to transactions already completed." ' If a statute is
found to operate retroactively, the traditional presumption holds
"that it does not
41 govern absent clear congressional intent favoring
such a result."
The Court further clarified the issue three years later in
Hughes Aircraft Company v. United States.' Whereas Landgraf
tacitly allowed for an exception to the anti-retroactivity
presumption for "jurisdictional" statutes,' in Hughes the Court
refined its analysis. The reason for the jurisdictional statute
exception was the fact that a new jurisdictional rule "takes away
no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to
hear the case."" Jurisdictional statutes, therefore, "speak to the
power of the court rather than to the rights or obligations of the
parties."4 The statute in question in Hughes, although at first
glance merely jurisdictional, in fact "create[d] jurisdiction where
none previously existed," thus affecting the substantive rights of
the concerned parties.' Therefore, despite its jurisdictional garb,
the statute was "as much subject to [the Court's] presumption
against retroactivity as any other." 7

39. Id. at 280. This is what is known as the two-step Landgraf test. The
first step is "to determine whether Congress has expressly prescribed the
statute's proper reach." Id. More often than not, of course, the analysis must
involve the second step. See infra note 41.
40. Landgraf,511 U.S. at 280. This is step two of the Landgrafanalysis.
41. Id.
42. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex. rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939,
950-51 (1997) (holding that amendment to jurisdictional provision of False
Claims Act permitting qui tam suits based on information in government's
possession did not apply retroactively to conduct occurring before its effective
date).
43. See Landgraf,511 U.S. at 274-75 (stating that the Court has "regularly
applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting jurisdiction, whether or not
jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was
filed").
44. Id. at 274 (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508-09 (1916)).
45. Id. The Court noted in a footnote that "[tihis jurisdictional rule does
not affect the general principle that a statute is not to be given retroactive
effect unless such construction is required by explicit language or by necessary
implication." Id. at 274 n.27.
46. Hughes, 520 U.S. at 951. The Court also noted that "in permitting
actions by an expanded universe of plaintiffs with different incentives, the
1986 amendment essentially creates a new cause of action, not just an
increased likelihood that an existing cause of action will be pursued." Id. at
950.
47. Id. at 951.
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III. JUDICiAL EXPANSION OF FSIA's
RETROACTIVE APPLICABILITY

Several circuit court decisions have recently addressed the
FSIA's applicability to claims arising from World War II-era
foreign sovereign conduct.' In all but one of these cases, 9 it was
the plaintiffs who argued for the FSIA to apply retroactively to
their claims, thus circumventing foreign sovereign immunity's
jurisdictional bar and allowing the federal courts to rule on their
cases' merits. There are significant inconsistencies" among those
circuit courts that have addressed the issue of the FSIA's
retroactive applicability, as well as some analytical confusion,
which perhaps accounts for the inconsistencies. This Part will
discuss these decisions, analyze the courts' reasoning, and critique
the diverse outcomes as imposing undue burdens on foreign-state
defendants and victim-plaintiffs alike. An argument that the
uncertainty and instability generated by these inconsistent rulings
are ultimately incompatible with the original purposes of the FSIA
will follow.
A. Haven v. Poland: The Opening of Pandora'sBox
Perhaps ironically, the first post-Landgraf holding that the
FSIA could be applied retroactively to pre-1952 claims occurred in
a case shortly thereafter dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.5 ' In Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska, the Illinois
district court noted that the question before it was not the usual

48. These circuits are: the Ninth in Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 967; the Second
in Abrams 11, 332 F.3d at 187 and Garb 11, 72 Fed. Appx. at 854-55; and the
District of Columbia in Hwang 11, 332 F.3d at 686.
49. The one exception was Abrams 11, 332 F.3d at 187, discussed at greater
length at infra notes 95-110 and accompanying text.
50. Thus, the Ninth and Second Circuits currently allow for either actual or
potential retroactive application of the FSIA to pre-1952 claims, while the
District of Columbia Circuit rules it out. See Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 967,
Garb 11, 72 Fed. Appx. at 854-55. But cf Hwang 11, 332 F.3d at 686 (holding
the FSIA's grant of jurisdiction over commercial activities not retroactively
applicable).
51. See Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska (Republic of Poland), 68 F. Supp. 2d
943 (N.D. Ill. 1999) [hereinafter Haven I] (holding FSIA could be applied
retroactively to claims arising before 1952). For the subsequent dismissal, see
Haven v. Rzeczpospolita Polska, 68 F. Supp. 2d 947 (N.D. Ill. 1999)
[hereinafter Haven II] (granting Poland's motion to dismiss and holding that
Poland's entry into a 1960 treaty with the United States regarding
expropriation claims by United States nationals did not waive Poland's
immunity as to other types of claimants, that the plaintiffs did not establish
waiver of immunity by treaty or consular employees, and that the commercial
exception under FSIA was inapplicable). Although not a circuit court decision,
the Haven holding is significant in that its post-Landgrafanalysis provides a
blueprint of sorts for subsequent circuit opinions throughout the country,
though, interestingly, not in the Seventh Circuit.
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one of whether a statute does or does not apply to acts preceding
its enactment date, but "rather how far back the retroactivity
stretches."52
Ostensibly following the Landgraf analysis,' the
Haven court in fact established the full retroactivity of the FSIA,
well beyond 1952. Thus, the Court effectively ignored the wellestablished
Second
and Eleventh
Circuit
pre-Landgraf
precedents.'
Contrary to these precedents, the Haven court deemed the
FSIA a solely jurisdictional statute.'
Framing the issue as a
battle of (three) circuits,' the court sided against the pre-Landgraf
tandem and with the D.C. Circuit, relying on its 1999 opinion in
Creighton Ltd. v. Government of the State of Qatar7 to find the
FSIA merely jurisdictional.' The court admitted that the question
"how far back the conduct susceptible to relief should go" was
"close,'
yet found the "District of Columbia view 61.. , more

52. Haven I, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 945 n.4 (emphasis added). In Haven I, the
former owners of property in Poland and the representatives of deceased
landowners' estates brought action against the Republic of Poland and its
agencies or instrumentalities for wrongful seizure and expropriation of real
property during and shortly after World War II. Id. at 944.
53. Id. at 945-46.
54. These were, respectively, Carl Marks & Co. v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, 841 F.2d 26 (2d Cir. 1988) (per curiam), and Jackson v. People's
Republic of China, 794 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1986). In Carl Marks, the court
dismissed an action against the Soviet Union to recover on debt instruments
issued by the Russian Imperial Government in 1916, stating, inter alia:
Such a retroactive application of the FSIA would affect adversely the
USSR's settled expectation, rising "to the level of an antecedent right,"
of immunity from suit in American courts .... We believe, as did the
district court, that "only after 1952 was it reasonable for a foreign
sovereign to anticipate being sued in the United States courts on
commercial transactions."
Carl Marks, 841 F.2d at 27. There is some uncertainty as to whether Carl
Marks is still good law in the Second Circuit. See Abrams v. Societe Nationale
Des Chemins De Fer Francais, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423, 434 (E.D.N.Y. 2001)
[hereinafter Abrams I] (commenting that "Carl Marks may no longer be good
law, or may at least be limited in its application" after Landgraf), vacated by
332 F.3d 173 (2003). The effect of the vacation order on the Carl Marks
dictum is unclear.
55. Haven 1, 68 F.Supp. 2d at 946.
56. The three embattled circuits were the Second and Eleventh, with their
anti-retroactive applicability precedents, and the District of Columbia, with its
decision in Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of the State of Qatar.
57. 181 F.3d 118 (D.C. Cir. 1999). In Creighton, the circuit court affirmed
the dismissal of an action brought by a foreign contractor with domestic offices
to enforce an arbitration award obtained in a foreign tribunal against the
government of Qatar. Id. at 128.
58. In its fondness for the Creighton reasoning, the Haven court went as far
as to proclaim that the court's analysis in Creighton "could equally well have
been written" for the case before it. Haven 1, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 946.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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persuasive. ' It found this view articulated in Creighton and
another post-Landgraf case, Princz v. Federal Republic of
Germany.'
Yet Creighton, contrary to the Haven court's
characterization, did not involve a pre-1952 claim at all,' and
Princz explicitly refused to decide whether the FSIA applies to pre1952 events." Moreover, although the Haven court characterized
the Princz majority as "postulating"" that such application "would
just remove the bar of sovereign immunity" in the plaintiffs
action, the language in the Princz opinion was actually qualified
by the additional proposition that it merely "might be argued" so."
All in all, then, the authority for the Haven court's holding
appears rather thin. An additional level of irony is provided by the
fact that the same court, having allowed the general FSIA
applicability to pre-1952 claims, dismissed the plaintiffs claim a
little over a month later.'
The case's history' leads one to
conclude that the Haven analysis had a larger playing field in
view, and was directed as much at future pre-1952 claims as it
was at the parties directly before the court. If so, the strategy
certainly proved effective, as the Haven holding soon became a
fixed feature of any FSIA retroactive applicability analysis."0
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In Princz, the District of Columbia
Circuit Court dismissed the case against the Federal Republic of Germany,
brought by an American citizen who survived the Holocaust, for injuries he
suffered and slave labor he performed while a prisoner in the Nazi
concentration camps. Id. at 1168-69.
After the district court denied
Germany's motion to dismiss, the split panel held that, even assuming that
the FSIA applied retroactively to events occurring between 1942 and 1945, no
exception to the general grant of sovereign immunity in that statute applied.
Id. at 1175. Barely postdating Landgraf,Princz was decided only a little over
two months after the Supreme Court's opinion. See Landgraf,511 U.S. at 244
(decided Apr. 1, 1994); Princz, 26 F.3d at 1166 (decided July 1, 1994).
64. The dispute in Creighton arose from the late 1970s. See Creighton, 181
F.3d at 120 (stating that "[iun the late 1970s the Government of Qatar decided
to build a new hospital in Doha"). In fact, Creighton did not even involve the
FSIA as such, but rather was only decided on the effect of a 1988 amendment
concerning the arbitration agreements. Id. at 121.
65. See Princz, 26 F.3d at 1171 (commenting that the court did not "have to
decide whethhr the FSIA applies to pre-1952 events, however, in order to
resolve this case").
66. Haven I, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 946.
67. Princz, 26 F.3d at 1171.
68. Haven 11, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 947.
69. The dismissal (Haven II) was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit in Haven
v. Rzeczpospolita Polska, 215 F.3d 727, 736-37 (7th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter
Haven III].
70. In fact, the Haven holding is said to embody, alongside Princz and
Creighton, "the modern trend" in favor of applying the FSIA to "pre-enactment
activities." Appellee's Opposition Brief on Expedited Appeal at 16, Altmann v.
Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (No. 00-8913).
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B. Altmann v. Austria: FSIA's "Not
Impermissibly Retroactive"Application
In Altmann v. Republic of Austria,7' a case recently reviewed
by the Supreme Court, 2 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's holding that the FSIA applied to a taking claim arising
from the Nazis' confiscation of artworks in 1938."' In a rather
convoluted opinion, the Ninth Circuit held that the "application of
the FSIA to the pre-1952 actions of the Republic of Austria is not
impermissibly retroactive."74
Adopting the reasoning of the
dissenting judge in Princz, the court concluded that "the
application of the FSIA [to this case] infringes on no right held at
the time the acts at issue occurred, and thus the FSIA is not
impermissibly applied to Austria in this case."75 Even if Austria
did not anticipate being sued76 in a foreign court before 1952, such
expectation would be clearly unreasonable and thus due no
judicial consideration.7
As the Supreme Court explained in Verlinden, "fu]ntil 1952,
the State Department ordinarily requested immunity in all actions
against friendly foreign sovereigns. " " The Ninth Circuit zeroed in
on the word "friendly"79 and reasoned that, as Nazi-occupied
Austria was clearly not a "friendly" state in the context of World
War II, it was entitled to no judicial deference," the absolute
doctrine of immunity to the contrary notwithstanding.
When stripped of its double negatives, the court's holding, by
declaring the FSIA application permissibly retroactive, further
confounds the FSIA retroactive applicability discussion, as it
injects into it an additional layer of analysis. According to the
Ninth Circuit's logic, the "application" of the FSIA can be either
permissibly or impermissibly retroactive. Note the conclusory
shift from "applicability" to "application." 1
By finding the
71. Altmann II, 317 F.3d at 954.
72. See supra note 15 (commenting on and providing background for the
Supreme Court's decision to review the Ninth Circuit's opinion).
73. See Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1187, at 1206-09
(C.D. Cal. 2001) [hereinafter Altmann I] (denying defendant's motion to

dismiss and holding that the FSIA applied to events prior to 1952).
74. Altmann 1I, 317 F.3d at 967.
75. Id. at 966.

76. Id. at 967.
77. Id.
78. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 486.

79. When the Ninth Circuit cited the Verlinden statement, it added
emphasis on the word "friendly," thus unmistakably implying that only

friendly foreign states could legitimately expect immunity from suits in
American courts. Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 964.
80. Id.
81. Although the Altmann court labeled the pertinent part of its analysis
"The Applicability of the FSIA," throughout its discussion it referred solely to
the FSIA's "application" to the case before it. Id. at 961-67.
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application of the FSIA to the case before it "not impermissibly
retroactive,""2 the court subtly shifted the emphasis from the
general and legal consideration of the statute's applicability to pre1952 claims to the specific and factual analysis of each claim.'
Giver, the right set of facts, it may be permissible to retroactively
apply the FSIA to pre-1952 claims84 According to the Ninth
Circuit, then, a case-by-case factual evaluation by the courts is
now required in FSIA retroactivity analysis.'
C. The Garb and Abrams Cases:
The Second CircuitFolds in on Itself
In Garb v. Republic of Poland,' the New York district court
refused to follow Haven87 and Altmann.' The court reiterated the
fact that "foreign states continued to enjoy virtually absolute
immunity from suit"8 in the Unites States before 1952, and stated
that "the FSIA effected a change in the law of foreign sovereign
immunity."' Reasoning that, under the Supreme Court teaching,
sovereign immunity is an issue of substantive, and not merely
jurisdictional law,9' the court found that "the FSIA should not be
applied retroactively to the extent that it adversely affects a
foreign state's settled expectation of immunity from suit."'

82. Id. at 967.
83. Id. at 964. In determining what rights Austria possessed when it acted
during and after World War II, the court "look[ed] to the practice of American
courts at that time, which was one of judicial deference 'to the case-by-case
foreign policy determinations of the executive branch.'" Significantly, here it
was the court itself that made such a determination, holding that Austria
could not expect immunity before 1952 given its alleged conduct. Id. at 965.
84. Id. at 967.
85. Such case-by-case factual analysis propels the Second Circuit in both its
Abrams II and Garb II decisions. See generallyAbrams 11, 332 F.3d 173; Garb
11, 72 Fed. Appx. 850.
86. Garb I, 207 F. Supp. 2d 16.
87. Haven I, 68 F. Supp. 2d 943. Technically speaking, of course, Haven I,
as a district court opinion, has no precedential value, although its impact on
the FSIA discussion cannot be doubted. See Appellee's Opposition Brief at 16,
Altmann v. Republic of Austria, 142 F. Supp. 2D 1187 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (No.
00-8913) (claiming that "the modem trend is very clearly in favor of
application of the FSIA to pre-enactment activities").
88. Altmann II, 317 F.3d 954.
89. Garb I, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 23.
90. Id. at 25.
91. Id. at 30. The Garb I court looked to Verlinden, in which the Supreme
Court stated that the FSIA "does not merely concern access to the federal
courts. Rather, it governs the types of actions for which foreign sovereigns
may be held liable in a court in the United States, federal or state." Id.
Accord Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 491.
92. Garb 1, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 29. The court thus followed the Carl Marks
precedent, unlike the Abrams I judge in the same New York district court.
Abrams 1, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 434.
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Abrams v. Societe Nationale des Chemins de Fer Francais93
presented the same district court with a different dilemma."s
Unlike all the other FSIA pre-1952 conduct actions, in Abrams the
95
plaintiffs argued that the FSIA does not apply to their action.
Instead, presumably aware of not being able to meet any FSIA
immunity exceptions, they sought to invoke federal jurisdiction
under international law and the Alien Tort Claims Act,' pinning
their strategy on the court's finding against the retroactive
applicability of the FSIA. The court dismissed the action on the
ground that no basis for subject matter jurisdiction other than the
FSIA existed,' and that the plaintiffs had indeed failed to fit any
FSIA exception.'
The Second Circuit vacated the dismissal." Significantly,
here it was the plaintiffs', and not the defendant's, antecedent
rights and settled expectations that would be impaired by applying
the FSIA retroactively.' 0 The court applied the Landgrafanalysis,
considering whether the FSIA's application to the case at bar
would have the "retroactive effect" under Landgraf and thus be
It
barred by the general presumption against retroactivity.'0 '
102

concluded that the record was insufficient to answer that query.'

93. Abrams 1, 175 F. Supp. 2d 423.
94. In Abrams I, Holocaust survivors filed suit against the French national
railroad company, claiming violations of international law and the law of
nations arising out of deportation of Jews and others from their homes in
France to various Nazi death camps during World War II. Id. at 425. As
summarized by the Second Circuit, "SNCF had conveyed more than 72
deportation convoys, taking to concentration camps 75,000 Jews and tens of
thousands of others. Fewer than three percent of those deported survived."
Abrams 11, 332 F.3d at 175.
95. The Abrams plaintiffs rested their argument against the retroactive
applicability of the FSIA on Carl Marks. Abrams 1, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 433-34.
96. According to the plaintiffs, claims arising under customary
international law are enforceable in the federal courts as federal common law
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 as well as the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
Id. at 433. For more on the Alien Tort Claims Act, see supra note 14.
97. The court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Amerada Hess, 488
U.S. 428. Abrams 1, 175 F. Supp. 2d at 440-41.
98. Id. at 433.
99. Abrams 11, 332 F.3d at 188.
100. Id. at 180. Presumably, the plaintiffs reasoned that, were the FSIA to
apply retroactively to their case, their claims would not fit in any of the FSIA's
immunity-stripping exceptions, thus impairing their antecedent rights and
settled expectations to have the questions of jurisdiction and immunity
resolved on the basis of the laws in effect in the 1940s. Id. Significantly, the
defendant in the case, SNCF, as a corporate entity separate and distinct from
the government, would not have been entitled to sovereign immunity at that
time. Id. at 175.
101. Id. at 183-87.
102. The court stated that "[tihe record contains no information with respect
to the State Department's position during World War II on the significance of
the corporate form in foreign sovereign immunity determinations." Id. at 188.

1352

The John Marshall Law Review

[37:1337

The court explicitly echoed Altmann when it observed that the pre1952 State Department's treatment of "friendly foreign states" is
not necessarily indicative
of its position with regard to "war-time
" 10 3
.
crimes of an enemy.
It was perhaps inevitable in the wake of Abrams that Garb
would not be left undisturbed. In an unpublished summary order,
the Second Circuit vacated the lower court's order,104 resting on the
Abrams panel's conclusion that the "general history of sovereign
immunity was insufficient to support a factual determination"'0 5 of
a particular defendant. The court's new-found emphasis on the
"'prominent role' of case-by-case recommendations from the
Department of State in sovereign immunity determinations prior
to the passage of the FSIA" °6 compelled the court to remand the
case.0 7 This order accomplished two things. Unfathomably, it
entirely avoided the crucial distinction between pre-1952 and post1952 claims."° Even more importantly, by focusing on the "caseby-case recommendations" of the executive branch, the Second
Circuit seems to have written the pre-1952 absolute theory of
foreign sovereign immunity out of existence."°
D. Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan:
The Limits of Retroactive Applicability
In its holding that "the commercial activity exception to the
FSIA does not apply retroactively to events occurring before May
19, 1952, ""1° the D.C. Circuit Court distanced itself from its own
dictum in Princz,"' and invoked Hughes as a clarification of
Nor did it find "any indication in the record whether the State Department
would have recognized immunity in a case such as the one before" it. Id.
103. Id. at 187. The court then cited, by way of illustration, the holding in
Altmann with regard to Austria. Id.
104. Garb11, 72 Fed. Appx. at 853.
105. Id. at 854.
106. Id. The Garb II panel ostensibly deferred to "this development in the
law of the Circuit" (i.e., the Abrams II panel's remanding to "allow the District
Court to undertake a factual inquiry" into the State Department's pre-FSIA
position on sovereign immunity). Id.
107. Id. at 854-55.
108. Thus, it referred to the State Department's position before the
enactment of the FSIA in 1976, and not the Tate Letter of 1952. Id. at 854.
Similarly, the Second Circuit Garb II panel framed the question presented
before it as one concerning "the liability of sovereign states for conduct
occurring prior to the [FSIA]'s enactment," and not prior to 1952. Id. at 853.
Yet, clearly, it is the FSIA's applicability to pre-1952 conduct that is
problematic. See Haven, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 945 n.4 (stating that the question
was "how far back the retroactivity stretches").
109. The absolute theory was officially replaced with the restrictive view
precisely in 1952, thus underscoring that particular date. For more on the
Tate Letter, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
110. Hwang 11, 332 F.3d at 687.
111. The court commented that its suggestion in Princz that "application of
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Landgraf."' It also explicitly investigated the congressional intent
to "legislate retroactively,"" 3 finding no basis for altering sovereign
immunity as it existed before 1952." The court reasoned that by
enacting the FSIA, Congress at most intended to incorporate the
doctrine of restrictive immunity into federal law, "not that the
doctrine be applied to1 5events that occurred before the United
States first adopted it."
M

E. A Summary
The FSIA was intended to "free the Government from the
case-by-case diplomatic pressures" and "assure litigants that...
decisions are made on purely legal grounds and under procedures
that insure due process."" 6 Recent appellate FSIA jurisprudence
has seriously undermined these goals, reinserting unpredictability
and uncertainty into foreign sovereign immunity analysis." '
Instead of applying transparent and consistent legal grounds,"8
the courts have gradually reverted to factual, case-by-case
Undoubtedly the morally and politically
investigations. ' 19
sensitive nature of plaintiffs' claims'20 helps account for judicial
the FSIA to pre-1952 events might not be of 'genuinely retroactive effect'"
under Landgraf"because the statute is jurisdictional rather than substantive
in nature" was too premature. Id. at 684. The Princz panel lacked the benefit
of the Supreme Court's subsequent clarification of Landgrafin Hughes, which
demanded the opposite conclusion. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 685. The court found "no clear indication that the Congress
intended 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) to apply to events occurring prior to 1952." Id.
at 685-86.
114. The court reasoned that "the decision of the Congress, concurrent with
the passage of the FSIA, to delete from 28 U.S.C. § 1332 the provision for
diversity jurisdiction over a suit brought by a United States citizen against a
foreign government" at most suggests the intent to apply the FSIA
retroactively to "events occurring between 1952 and 1976," but not before
1952. Id. at 686.
115. Id.
116. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976)).
117. The uncertainty stems, for one, from the judicial determination whether
a particular foreign sovereign defendant qualified, prior to 1952, as a "friendly
foreign state" or not. See Altmann 11, 317 F.3d at 964-65 (holding that Austria
could not qualify). This can be highly problematic in cases of European
countries conquered and officially administered by the Nazis from 1939 to
1945, which constituted a significant portion of Europe at the time.
118. For the legislative preference for purely legal grounds, as expressed by
Congress itself, see Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488 (quoting the House Report
concerning the FSIA).
119. This is the "trend" initiated by Haven I, 68 F. Supp. 2d at 946, and fully
embraced by the Second Circuit in Abrams II and Garb II. Abrams 11, 332
F.3d at 187; Garb 11, 72 Fed. Appx. at 854-55.
120. All the cases under discussion here involve, in a more or less direct
manner, either the Jewish Holocaust in Europe or the forced prostitution of
women in the Far East during the years of World War II.
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creativity in refusing to dismiss World War II-related actions. Yet
this judicial activism is ultimately irresponsible. It potentially
violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers.' and
threatens to undermine the legislative intent behind the FSIA."2
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court's decision to review the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Altmann suggests that the recent inconsistencies in
circuit-level FSIA jurisprudence may finally be eliminated. 2 3 The
Court will ostensibly address only one of the three questions
presented in Austria's petition for writ of certiorari, namely
whether the Act's "expropriation
exception ... afford[s]
jurisdiction over claims against foreign states based on conduct
that occurred before the United States adopted the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity in 1952." 12' Given this language, it is
clear that the Court is free to limit its holding to the narrow issue
of the expropriation exception alone. Yet the Court should instead
use this opportunity to reject unequivocally, and once and for all,
the retroactive applicability of the FSIA to pre-1952 conduct. The
growing trend to legitimize the erosion of sovereign immunity
ought to be reversed by the Court as an unwarranted judicial
attempt to undermine the legislative intent behind the FSIA.
Because the issues involved implicate the United States'
relationship with other nations at a time when building
international alliances is of paramount importance for the United
States government, it is particularly important that the Court cut
short the judicial efforts to find jurisdiction over some of America's
closest allies and strategic partners. If it chooses not to adopt this
course, passing the FSIA question back to the legislative branch
would certainly be a legitimate option.'
Yet, for foreign policy
and constitutional reasons, the better solution would be to simply
declare the unamended FSIA not retroactively applicable to claims
arising from pre-1952 events.

121. The Second Circuit Garb 11 panel itself calls for "appropriate attention
to separation-of-powers concerns, inasmuch as the conduct of foreign relations
is delegated to the political branches." Garb 11, 72 Fed. Appx. at 855 n.1.
122. Verlinden, 461 U.S. at 488.
123. For details of the case's procedural history, see the United States
Supreme Court's website at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/docket/03-13.htm
(last visited July 1, 2004).
124. Id.
Brief for the Republic of Austria at i, Republic of Austria v.
Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004) (No. 03-13).
125. See, e.g., Malvina Halberstam, The Application of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act to an Action Against the French Railroad for Transporting
Thousands of Jews and Others to Their Deaths: Abrams v. SNCF, 15 N.Y.
INT'L L. REV. 1, 6 (2002)(discussing in detail the Abrams case and calling for
FSIA to be amended to deny sovereign immunity for violations of specific
human rights treaties, "provided that the state has ratified the treaty").
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The Expansion of Its Retroactive Applicability
Violates the FSIA's Objective

When Congress decided to codify the restrictive theory of
sovereign immunity, it did so chiefly to "take the question of
immunity vel non out of the hands of the Department of State and
put it in the hands of the judiciary.""6 The move was intended
both to free the government's political branches of the diplomatic
pressures from foreign states sued in American courts, and to
guarantee the foreign states, by applying to their cases purely
legal standards instead of ad hoc, non-transparent and often
politically motivated criteria, a degree of predictability and
certainty. The recent developments in FSIA jurisprudence run
counter to both of these principles.
First, by reverting to factual investigations, the courts
increasingly necessitate the involvement of the State Department,
the very problem the passage of the FSIA sought to avoid. The
burden on the State Department is both unnecessary and
counterproductive, as it tends to divert its limited resources from
the tasks of the day. In 1976, the legislative branch acted to
relieve the executive branch from involvement in the foreign
sovereign immunity adjudication by handing the matter to the
judiciary.
Instead of clarity, the judiciary has produced
inconsistency and confusion, and in effect has begun the process of
turning back to the executive, blatantly disregarding the
legislative purpose behind the 1976 Act. The Supreme Court
should now provide the clarity hoped for by Congress when it
enacted the FSIA in the first place.
The Court's clarification will also benefit the foreign
sovereigns entangled in litigation before American courts. The
Ninth Circuit's characterization of World War II-era Austria as
"unfriendly" is at best arbitrary, and at worst exceeds the judicial
mandate. In fact, the characterization was directly contradicted
by the executive branch in its amicus brief.127 Before 1952, the
United States adhered to the absolute sovereign immunity
doctrine, which held that no foreign state could be effectively sued
in American courts at all." Allowing the courts to decide today
whether a particular foreign government was friendly or not to the
United States before 1952 is thus both problematic and irrelevant.
It is problematic because courts are hardly qualified to decide such
matters. It is, or at least should be, irrelevant, because, prior to
the Tate Letter, no foreign government, regardless of its label as
"friendly" or otherwise, was amenable to suit in the United States

126. Dorsey, supra note 21, at 261.
127. Brief for Austria at 14-15, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct.
2240 (2004) (No. 03-13).
128. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
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courts.
B. Applying FSIA Retroactively Threatens
to Violate Separation of Powers
In vacating Garb, the Second Circuit directed the district
courts to "invite the participation of the Department of State in
developing a record to support" the courts' determinations.1 29 It
qualified this "invitation" with a footnote recognizing the
precariousness of the separation-of-powers conundrum. 3 '
On the one hand, the conduct of foreign relations is delegated
to the political branches, and any adjudication of claims against
foreign sovereigns risks significant interference with foreign
relations policy, and thus raises justiciability concerns. On the
other, avoiding a bright line rule against applying the FSIA to pre1952 conduct necessarily involves such "invitations" to the very
branches that in effect turned them down when Congress enacted
the FSIA in 1976. Courts face the dilemma of either encroaching
on the other branches' terrain themselves, or unduly burdening
the executive branch by encouraging it to participate in
adjudication."' There is a way out, however. The Supreme Court
should simply eliminate the problem by adjudging the FSIA not
applicable to pre-1952 conduct.
C. Why Amending the FSIA Is Not Worth the Trouble
There is, of course, the possibility that Congress itself may
129. Garb H, 72 Fed. Appx. at 855.
130. In its entirety, the footnote reads:
We caution the District Courts that the necessary factual inquiry should
be conducted with appropriate attention to separation-of-powers
concerns, inasmuch as the conduct of foreign relations is delegated to
the political branches (citation omitted), and the adjudication of claims
that risk significant interference with foreign relations policy may raise
justiciability concerns.
Id.at 855 n. 1 (citation omitted).
131. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, perennial rivalries
and conflicts of interest between the judiciary and the executive branches of
the government have become only more acute. See, e.g., Smith ex rel. Estate of
Smith v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 346 F.3d 264 (2d Cir. 2003) (affirming
summary judgment for the defendants in a declaratory action by relatives of
World Trade Center victims against the Federal Reserve Bank and the
Secretary of Treasury seeking to satisfy their judgment of $63 million against
the Republic of Iraq by attaching Iraqi assets held by the Bank, and holding
that the assets became property of the United States pursuant to the
President's Executive Order). In its order, the District Court stated that "one
wonders whether American families who lost loved ones as a result of
terrorism here and abroad ought not be compensated first." Smith ex rel.
Estate of Smith v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 280 F. Supp. 2d 314, 324
(S.D.N.Y. 2003). It nonetheless granted the defendant's motion. Id. In Smith,
the court had to contend with the fact that it was the executive's decision that
placed the assets beyond the scope of a pertinent statute. Id.
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amend the FSIA so that it purports to apply to pre-1952 conduct.
Although the distance between the present and World War II
increases with each passing year, it is still easy to understand why
certain constituencies would continue being greatly interested in
such an amendment. Yet such an amendment would itself not
escape the problems outlined above. In addition, after Landgraf,it
too would be most likely found unconstitutional.'33 Congress has
no more power to legislate retroactively than the courts do to apply
one of its acts to remote, pre-enactment events.

V.

CONCLUSION

There is no doubt that the comfort women's grievances
deserve an answer from the government of Japan." Similarly, the
property rights of European Jewry should be, and in fact in many
cases already have been, addressed by the governments of various
European states which at one point violated those rights."u Yet
the United States federal courts are not the right forum for
The FSIA, as a statute affecting
addressing these claims.
substantive rights of foreign sovereigns, is subject to the Supreme
Court's strong presumption against retroactivity. Because foreign
states could not have been sued in American courts before the
M

132. The FSIA has been amended several times since its passage in 1976,
most notably in 1988, providing for the enforcement of international
arbitration agreements and execution of foreign arbitral awards, and again in
1996, when the so-called Flatow Amendment provided a cause of action to
victims of state-sponsored terrorism, relied on by the plaintiffs in Smith. An
Act to Implement The Inter-American Convention on International
Commercial Arbitration of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-669, 102 Stat. 3969 (1988);
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-172 (1996).
133. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 534 (1998) (holding the Coal
Industry Retiree Health Benefit Act of 1992 unconstitutional in part because
Congress made it retroactive to 1950, and stating that "[tihe distance into the
past that the Act reaches back to impose a liability.., and the magnitude of
that liability raise substantial questions of fairness").
134. A legislative bill to hasten the resolution of issues relating to comfort
women was debated but not enacted by the House of Councilors, the upper
chamber of Japan's National Diet in 2002, and was again postponed in 2003
"due to lack of time." It is expected to be debated again in 2004. Yumi WijersHasegawa, Former Sex Slaves Say There Is Not Much Time Left for Japan to
Atone, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 8, 2003, http'J/www.japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/getarticle.pl5?nn20030808a3.htm.
135. There is a wealth of recent literature on the topic. For a good overview,
see STUART EIZENSTAT, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: LOOTED ASSETS, SLAVE LABOR,
AND THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF WORLD WAR 11 (2003) (chronicling the
author's participation as the U.S. President's special envoy for property
restitution in complex negotiations between Holocaust survivor groups and
several Swiss banks, culminating in a settlement for more than a billion
dollars). Poland remains the last Central European state without private
property restitution legislation, but as it is set to join the European Union on
May 1, 2004, one can expect appropriate legislation to follow suit soon.
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American adoption of the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign
immunity in 1952, they should not be now exposed to liability
arising from their pre-1952 conduct. The Supreme Court should
extend its retroactivity jurisprudence to the FSIA, and reverse the
judicial trend of allowing the narrow statutory immunity
exceptions to apply to World War II-related claims. The past is
another country, 116 and other countries' past conduct should not be
adjudicated in American courts today.

136. L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-BETWEEN (1953).

